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The Fraudulent' Case Against Affirmative
Action-The Untold Story Behind Fisher v.
University of Texas
MARK

S. BRODINt

The Wisdom of the Past:

"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way." 2
-Justice HarryBlackmun
"By virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality,
[underrepresented minority students] are both likely to have
experiences of particularimportance to [a university's] mission,

t Professor and Lee Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1972; B.A., Columbia College, 1969. I
gratefully acknowledge the generosity of the Michael and Helen Lee Scholars
Fund, the able research assistance of Sydney Leigh Hanson, Jennifer Henricks,
Stephen Kelly, and Melissa Waite, and the insightful comments offered at a
recent faculty workshop at the Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary
Center, Herzliya, Israel.
0 Mark S. Brodin.
1. "False representation of a matter of fact-whether by words or by
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should
have been disclosed-that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that
the individual will act upon it to her or his legal injury." 4 WEST's ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN LAW 487 (2005). Paul Krugman has similarly referred to the
"culture of fraud" among certain economists willing to lend their credibility to
the agenda of a political campaign. Paul Krugman, Cultureof Fraud,N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/
culture-of-fraud/?_php=true&_type=blogs& r=0.
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria
that ignore those experiences."I
-Justice SandraDay O'Connor
The New Mantra:

"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminatingon the basisof race."I
-Chief Justice John Roberts
"The University's professed good intentions [in support of raceconscious admissions] cannot excuse its outright racial
discrimination any more than such intentions justified the now
denounced argumentsof slaveholdersand segregationists."I
-Justice Clarence Thomas
INTRODUCTION

John Roberts and Clarence Thomas are among the
foremost prosecutors of the case against affirmative action'
and, indeed, any race conscious effort to alleviate the effects
of long-standing discrimination. Roberts authored the
Court's opinion in Parents Involved, striking down
voluntary school desegregation plans that employed racial
classifications to achieve their goals. Clarence Thomas has
for years insisted that consideration of race in the interest
of a more diverse workplace or student body is little
different than the pernicious de jure segregation of the Jim
Crow era, and so must be judged by the very same exacting
standards of strict scrutiny.7 As historical analogies go, this
rates among the most bizarre. Thomas goes so far, as noted
above, to accuse his colleagues who disagree on this point of
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003).
4. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701,

705 (2007).
5. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2013) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
6. As used here, the term refers to race or gender preferences, as compared
with less controversial practices such as outreach or mentoring.
7. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2428-29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J. concurring); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370-71
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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resorting to the discredited arguments pitched by the
defenders of segregation in Brown v. Board of Education.'
Another central tenet of the critique of affirmative
action is that it sacrifices "merit" to preferential treatment,
elevates the deserving over the undeserving, and "lowers
the standards."9 Karen Torre, lawyer for the successful
white plaintiffs in the 2009 reverse discrimination case
against the New Haven Fire Department ("N.H.F.D."),'0 was
quoted on the courthouse steps describing the case as "a
'symbol' for millions of Americans who are 'tired of seeing
individual achievement and merit take a back seat to race
and ethnicity."'"" Such is the over-heated rhetoric of our day.
In fact, "merit" and "standards" are often code for the
collection of dubious practices that have reserved for white
males a large slice of society's goodies. In this category, we
must put the 100-question multiple-choice test of the ability
to memorize a fire manual, which propelled Torre's client
Frank Ricci to appointment as captain in the N.H.F.D.12
Birmingham firefighter Kenny Wilks, lead plaintiff in
another reverse discrimination case discussed below,3
captured the sophistication of such personnel selection:
"You take the same test I take. If I beat you, I get [the job].

8. See Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2428-29; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772-78
(comparing the dissenter's arguments to the segregationist's arguments in
Brown v. Board of Education).
9. Sonia Sotomayor, a Puerto Rican child of the South Bronx, recalls her
days at Princeton: "The Daily Princetonianroutinely published letters to the
editor lamenting the presence on campus of 'affirmative action students,' each
one of whom had presumably displaced a far more deserving affluent white male
.
SONIA....SOTOMAYOR, My BELOVED WORLD 145 (2013).
10. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
11. Lani Guinier & Susan Storm, Trial by Firefighters,N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2009, at A19.
12. See Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven FirefightersCase
& the Triumph of White Privilege,20 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 161, 211-12
(2011) [hereinafter Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege].
13. See discussion infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
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If you beat me, you get it. That's what the merit system is all

about."14
The case against affirmative action is built, in sum,
upon gross distortions of history and current reality." Yet,
in the public mind, diversity preferences have become the
antithesis of fair play.
We of course have always had (with nary a complaint)
"affirmative action" for certain privileged groups. In higher
education, these include athletes (especially those on the
coach's recruiting list),1 6 "legacies" (dubbed "affirmative
action for rich white people"), 17 "development cases,"" oboe

14. Karen Schneider, U.S. Battle Brews on Job Laws: Affirmative Action
Advocates FightBack, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 26, 1990, at A15 (emphasis added).
15. A third misconception is what one writer calls "the causation fallacy"the mistaken notion that when white applicants are rejected and minorities
with equal or lesser qualifications are admitted, the likely cause is affirmative
action. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2002). Yet
"the reflexive tendency to blame affirmative action" for one's rejection at work or
school stubbornly persists. Id. at 1078.
16. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE
GAME: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2003).
17. DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: How AMERICA'S RULING CLASS
Buys ITS WAY INTO ELITE COLLEGES-AND WHO GETS LEFT OUTSIDE THE GATES 6

(2006); see also Daniel Golden, An Analytic Survey of Legacy Preference, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 71, 89

(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) [hereinafter Golden, An Analytic Survey];
Gene Nichol, Race, Legacy and Affirmative Action, THE PROGRESSIVE POPULIST,
Oct. 15, 2012, at 20. According to Richard Kahlenberg's research, over 90% of
top American universities grant preferences to children of alumni, worth on
average a boost of 160 points (out of 1600) on the SAT score. Richard D.
Kahlenberg, Introductionto AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: PREFERENCES IN
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS, supra, at 1-2, 6. Legacy admits, overwhelmingly white
and affluent, often come in with significantly lower profiles than their
classmates. The seats they occupy have a disparate impact on students of color.
Id. at 10. "If affirmative action is aimed at opening the doors to excluded
minorities, legacy preferences were designed to slam those doors shut." John
Brittain & Eric L. Bloom, Admitting the Truth: The Effect of Affirmative Action,
Legacy Preferences, and the MeritocraticIdeal of Students of Color in College
Admissions, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS, supra, at 123, 136.
18. Golden, An Analytic Survey, supranote 17, at 98-99.
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players, applicants from farm states, children of faculty, etc.
As Justice Blackmun put it in Bakke:
It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a
program where race is an element of consciousness, and yet to be
aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of higher learning
... have given conceded preferences

up to a point to those

possessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to the
affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to
those having connections with celebrities, the famous, and the
powerful.19

Legacy admits are particularly troublesome because, as
one observer notes, "it's hard to think of a more base
rejection of egalitarian, merit-based decision-making than
legacy preference-admission by bloodline."2 0 Evidence that
such admissions boost financial resources of universities,
one of its oft-stated justifications, is weak at best. 2 1 Legacy
admits outnumber affirmative action admits at the nation's
most elite schools. 22 And legacy preference puts increased
pressure on college admission officers to rely on affirmative
action to achieve a "diverse student population."2 3 Yet, legal
challenges to legacy preference have been rare and
unsuccessful. 24
Notwithstanding the prevalence of these non-merit
preferences, any nod to a candidate's race, ethnicity, or
gender is likely to bring an outcry,25 with little if any

19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

265, 404 (1978)

20. Nichol, supra note 17.
21. Kahlenberg, supra note 17, at 7-9; Golden, An Anayltic Survey, supra

note 17, at 101-21.
22. Golden, An Anayltic Survey, supra note 17, at 124.
23. Id. at 132.

24. Kahlenberg, supra note 17, at 11-12.
25. See, e.g., Brooks H. Spears, "Ifthe PlaintiffsAre Right, GrutterIs Wrong":
Why Fisher v. University of Texas Presents an Opportunity for the Supreme
Court to Overturn a Flawed Decision, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1113, 1117 (2012)

(referring to acceptance of "minority students with below-average credentials,"
and the "relax[ing of] standards to admit more minorities"). Few legal issues,
Justice William Brennan observed forty years ago, "have stirred as much
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thought as to whether the traditional selection procedures
(often standardized tests) themselves represent a fair and
reliable way to select among applicants.2 6
The courts have certainly played their part in
perpetuating the myth of merit vs. affirmative action. In
Ricci v. DeStefano,2 7 Justice Kennedy simply took for
granted that the multiple-choice examination could reliably
identify those firefighters who should be promoted to
lieutenant and captain, and in the precise order, despite
compelling expert evidence to the contrary.2 8 Such exercises
in memorization of material that can be learned quickly onthe-job favor those, usually white applicants, with friends or
relatives already working in the department who can be
valuable resources in learning how to play the civil service
game.2 9
The untold story is that the use of more reliably
predictive methods of selection, such as those used by the
military,3 0 would go far in obviating the need for affirmative
action in the first place.
debate." DeFunis v. Odegaard,
dissenting).

416 U.S.

312,

350 (1974) (Brennan, J.,

26. See, e.g., Spears, supra note 25, at 1127. Referring to UT's admissions
process, Spears contrasts the traditional profile of SAT results and GPA values
which are "merit-based and noncontroversial" with the personal achievement
score which "involves the holistic review of a number of qualitative factors
including the applicant's leadership qualities, work experience, socioeconomic
status, and race." Id. The author dismisses Judge Higginbotham's
characterization of the personal achievement score as "designed to recognize
qualified students whose merit as applicants was not adequately reflected by
their [academic record]." See id. at n.97.
27. See 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). See generally Brodin, Triumph of White
Privilege,supra note 12.
28. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678-81. Even 'liberal" justices seem to have an
abiding faith in our ability to weigh "individual merit or achievement." Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
29. In one notable example, a buildings trade union set up "'cram courses' for
the sons and nephews of present union members in order to prepare them for
the entrance tests," thus assuring their success over minority applicants. See
E.E.O.C. v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege,supranote 12, at 228.
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The media has contributed greatly to the public
misunderstanding, often dubbing any race-conscious action
a quota, while any testing device, no matter how dubious, as
a merit-selector.3' Typical are headlines in the New York
Post condemning the federal district judge who has been
critical of the tests used for hiring and promotion in the fire
department: It's Time to Fire the Judge Who Rewards
32
Failure
and Drop the FDNY Quotas." In fact, Judge
Nicholas Garaufis has neither ordered the hiring of
unqualified firefighters nor established quotas.3 4
A Gallup poll question sets up the false dichotomy:
Some people say that to make up for past discrimination, women
and minorities should be given preferential treatment in getting
jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined
by test scores, should be the main consideration. Which point of
35
view comes closer to how you feel on the subject?

Not surprisingly, upwards of 80% selected "ability."3 6 As
we know after decades of highly successful public relations
campaigns, the framing of the issue and the choice of labels
are central to the public's perception." The anti-affirmative
31.

See id. at 163 n.16.

32. Letter to the Editor, It's Time to Fire the Judge Who Rewards Failure,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 15, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/03/15/its-time-tofire-the-judge-who-rewards-failure/.
33. See Op-Ed, Drop the FDNY Quotas, N.Y. POST (Aug. 9, 2010, 4:00 AM),
http://nypost.com/2010/08/09/drop-the-fdny-quotas/.
34. See United States. v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013). His
order, requiring the City to develop new testing procedures for firefighters that
did not have the disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants of the
previous exams, was affirmed. Id. at 95-99.
35. RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 4 (1969) (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. See generally FRANK I. LUNTZ, WORDS THAT WORK: IT'S NOT WHAT YOU
SAY, IT'S WHAT PEOPLE HEAR (2006); Jill Lepore, The Lie Factory: How Politics
Became a Business, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2012, at 50, 53, 56-58 (detailing how
the first political public relations firm sank progressive Upton Sinclair's 1934
run for governor of California, and went on to defeat Governor Earl Warren's
plan for compulsory health insurance for the state and President Truman's
similar plan for the nation by portraying them as "socialized medicine"). It is
interesting to note that affirmative action is known as "positive discrimination"
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action effort has thus achieved impressive results in the
political arena, with several states outlawing its use by
ballot initiative or executive order, beginning with
California, Florida, and Washington in the 1990s, and more
recently extending to Arizona, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, and Oklahoma. 8
For those who extol standardized tests and condemn socalled "holistic" approaches as benefitting the unqualified,39
one might ask if that is the way they choose their own
doctors, lawyers, or accountants? Do they ignore matters of
character, dependability, judgment, commitment, or
personal affability, in favor of a singular focus on academic
record and test scores? As Chief Justice Warren Burger
recognized, "[h]istory is filled with examples of men and
women who rendered highly effective performance without
the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of
certificates, diplomas, or degrees."40
Thomas Jefferson's admirable ideal of a "natural
aristocracy" based on "virtue and talent" rather than wealth
or ancestry 4 1 leaves open the perplexing question-how do
we reliably identify virtue and talent?
"Affirmative action" and "quota" have become slurs for
attacking any innovative approach designed to give
minorities or females a fair chance at success by untangling
the matrix of "color-blind" criteria that are anything but. To
paraphrase one of the earliest ruminations on the subject:
any deviation from "the usual method" of selection will of

in the United Kingdom and as "employment equity" in Canada and elsewhere.
See Marjorie Cohn, Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human
Rights Treaties: United States' Violation of Its InternationalObligations, 43 VA.
J. INT'L L. 249, 267-70 (2002).
38. Nelson D. Schwartz & Michael Cooper, Racial Diversity Efforts Ebb for
Elite
Careers, Analysis
Finds, N.Y.
TIMES
(May
27,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/texas-firm-highlights-struggle-for-blackprofessionals.html.
39. See WOLTERS, supra note 35, at 170-72.
40. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
41. 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 232 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829).
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course "appear unjust to those who are accustomed" to
succeeding by those methods.4 2
Fisher v. University of Texas ,43 a challenge to the very
modest weighing of race in admissions at the University of
Texas, is only the most recent vehicle for reigning in efforts
towards inclusion." Its begrudging acceptance, at least for
the time being, of the concept of affirmative action (but
setting an exceedingly high bar for its defense) implicitly
accepts the new paradigm of white victimhood, where one's
disappointments can be blamed simplemindedly on
affirmative action. But, in truth, the fault often lies not in
the stars, but in themselves. 45
At stake in Fisher is nothing less than a traditional
gateway into politics, government, business, and the
professions-the great American public university4 6-and
thus the very opportunity for social mobility.47 The dramatic
reversals of minority representation at the institutions that
have abandoned affirmative action because of court orders
42. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination,41
U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 723 n.3 (1974) (quoting Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment
and Compensatory Discrimination,2 PHIL. &PUB. AFF. 348, 360 (1973)).
43. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
44. Fisher was followed the next day by Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,
declaring unconstitutional a key provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
which had brought millions of African Americans into the voting booth for the
first time since Reconstruction, was reauthorized several times by
overwhelming majorities in Congress, and had been upheld by the Court on
each prior occasion. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619-21, 2651
(2013).
45. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act I, sc. ii; see infra note 144.
46. In their classic study, William G. Bowen and Derek Bok document the

extent to which the elite universities position graduates in the "pipeline" for
entry into these endeavors. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 280-86 (1998).
47. For the marked decrease in upward mobility and disturbing upturn in

inequality of wealth, see NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA,
REDEEM THE DREAM 12-59 (2013) and JACOB S. HECKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER
TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS
BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 15-33 (2010). The gap between black and white
family income and wealth remains staggering. See CHRISTOPHER HAYES,
TWILIGHT OF THE ELITES: AMERICA AFTER MERITOCRACY 61-62 (2012).
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or voter initiatives 48 will long reverberate throughout the
society.
This paper traces the political evolution of affirmative
action from its origins in the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations through its despised status during the
Reagan years, and the Supreme Court's parallel path from
enthusiasm to outright hostility. Defying predictions that
race-conscious selections would be strictly prohibited by the
Roberts Court, 49 Fisher v. University of Texas will likely
nonetheless achieve the same result by its application of the
severest standards of judicial scrutiny, anachronistically
borrowed from cases challenging segregation and pernicious
discrimination. The article contests this false equivalency
between practices that utilize race to include and those that
do so to exclude. It also challenges the contention of its
opponents that affirmative action means sacrificing merit to
special preference by confronting the myths and
misconceptions surrounding "merit," and particularly the
stubborn reliance upon standardized testing.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION"50

The phrase "affirmative action" originated with
President John F. Kennedy," but was greatly expanded
48. See William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter:A
History of African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School
Admissions, 1950-2000, 19 HARv. BLAcKLETTER L.J. 1, 28-36 (2003); David B.
Oppenheimer, Color-Blindness, Racism-Blindness, and Racism-Awareness:
RevisitingJudge Henderson'sProposition209 Decision, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM.
L. & POL'Y 229, 242-48 (2011).
49. The Chief Justice similarly defied predictions a year before when he
authored the opinion upholding the Affordable Health Care Act, but with the
poison pill proclaiming that Congress had exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause, the underpinning of most social legislation. See Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566-93 (2012).
50. For an extensive history of affirmative action, see BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 46, at 1-14.
51. See Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 8, 1961). President
Johnson followed with the more elaborate Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg.
12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965). Every president from Nixon to Carter supported similar
efforts. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 828-29 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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upon by his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. Originally, it
meant simply reaching out to recruit and assist minorities
after years of discriminatory treatment.5 2 President Johnson
explained the rationale:
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now, you
are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose
the leaders you please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race
and then say, "you are free to compete with all the others," and
still justly believe you have been completely fair.

This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil
rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just
legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a
theory but equality as a fact and as a result.
For the task is to give 20 million Negroes the same chance as
every other American to learn and grow, to work and share in
society, to develop their abilities-physical, mental and spiritual,
and to pursue their individual happiness.
To this end equal opportunity is essential, but not enough, not
enough. Men and women of all races are born with the same range
of abilities. But ability is not just the product of birth. Ability is
stretched or stunted by the family that you live with, and the
neighborhood you live in-by the school you go to and the poverty
or the richness of your surroundings. It is the product of a
hundred unseen forces playing upon the little infant, the child,
and finally the man.53

For a comparison of affirmative action policies and laws in other jurisdictions,
see DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, SHEILA R. FOSTER, & SORA Y. HAN, COMPARATIVE
EQUALITY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 234-308 (2012).
52. An early example in the academic context was Harvard Law School's
"special summer program," initiated in 1965, that brought forty AfricanAmerican college students from the South to Cambridge for an introduction to
the legal profession. Kidder, supra note 48, at 11.
53. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard
University (June 4, 1965), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 635-40 (1966).
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No doubt "affirmative action" implicitly recognizes the
dilemma of a "discrete and insular minority" with limited
political and economic clout. 5 4 It also was aimed, as Shelby
Steele has observed, at "the restoration of legitimacy" to
American institutions:
[T]he original goal of affirmative action was to achieve two
redemptions simultaneously. As society gave a preference to its
former victims in employment and education, it hoped to redeem
both those victims and itself. When America-the world's oldest
and most unequivocal democracy-finally acknowledged in the
1960s its heartless betrayal of democracy where blacks were
concerned, the loss of moral authority was profound. In their
monochrome whiteness, the institutions of this societycorporations-became
agencies,
government
universities,
emblems of the very evil America had just acknowledged."

By the 1970s and 1980s, in the face of the intransigence
of many governmental (particularly municipal) employers,
minority plaintiffs, together with the U.S. Justice
Department, brought civil rights lawsuits all across the
country that were often resolved by consent decrees
providing for racial preferences in hiring or promotion.
Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland 6 upheld such a decree over the Title VII
and constitutional objections of the firefighters union.5 7 The
City and plaintiffs had agreed to the consent order after the
district judge found evidence of a historical pattern of racial
54. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). It
remains to be seen whether the election of Barack Obama in 2008, in the unique
circumstances of a severe economic crisis, and his reelection in 2012, make
African Americans less of an "out-group." Cf. Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and
Mobility: A ProgressiveView of Class, Culture, and the Law, 43 U. MEM. L. REV.
239 (2012).
55. Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action Is Just A Distraction,WASH. POST, July
26, 2009, at B4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402090.html.

56. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
57. Id. at 515. For the somewhat different legal standards applied in
constitutional equal protection cases (for public actors) and Title VII challenges,
see generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 225-54 (4th ed. 2012); see also Johnson v.
Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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discrimination in promotions in the fire department.58 As
was typical of such decrees, only those deemed qualified by
virtue of the civil service test were eligible for the racial
preference," a point the Sixth Circuit emphasized when it
affirmed the decree, 60 but often lost in the media coverage61
as well as by Justice White in his dissent. 62
Local No. 93 stood in a long line of cases in which the
Court, while forbidding strict quotas, left ample room for
minority preference in both public employment and
university admissions. Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke6 1 struck down an inflexible set-aside of
sixteen out of one hundred seats for minorities at the
medical school, but Justice Lewis Powell's influential swing
opinion green-lighted the consideration of race as a "plus"
factor in the admissions process." Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education6 held unconstitutional a minority preference
in lay-offs for public school teachers that displaced white
teachers with more seniority; but hiring goals were deemed
permissible. 66 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 67 and

58. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1986).
59. Id. at 510.
60. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 485 (6th Cir.
1985).
61. See, e.g., Al Larkin and William Doherty, Civil Service ChiefMay Appeal
Order Easing Blacks into Police List, BoSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1973, at 5
(quoting a state official as saying, "We could end up with an illiterate person or
even a blind man on the police force.").
62. White decried the "leapfrogging [of] minorities over senior and better
qualified whites." Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 534 (White, J. dissenting). The
dissenters accepted on faith that the civil service tests could actually identify
not only those qualified for promotion, but those better qualified among that
group.
63. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
64. Id. at 317, 319-20. The Court seemed in no hurry to tackle the issue of
affirmative action, having just four years before dismissed as moot a similar
challenge to the minority admissions program at the University of Washington
Law School. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974).
65. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
66. Id. at 282-84. Justice Powell wrote:
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Adarand Construction,Inc. v. Pena68 effectively struck down
strict set-asides for minority contractors,'6 9 but Johnson v.
Santa Clara Transportation Department7 0 extended the
limited license for preference under Title VII from race to
gender when it permitted the public employer to promote a
woman over a man who scored higher on the civil service
list, pursuant to its affirmative action plan.'
The Court was equally open to voluntary race-conscious
efforts in the private sphere.72 United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber73 recognized that
employers needed to have flexibility to diversify their
workforces, particularly to avoid imminent lawsuits. Kaiser
Aluminum Corp. was facing litigation with only five African
Americans among 273 skilled craftworkers (a scant 1.83%
[I]n order to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, it may be
necessary to take race into account. As part of the Nation's dedication
to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called
upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. "When effectuating a
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior
discrimination, such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not
impermissible."
Id. at 280-81 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976)).
Justice Stevens emphasized the compelling public interest in diversity:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board
may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to
provide benefits to the student body that could not be provided by an
all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty. For one of the most important
lessons that the American public schools teach is that the diverse
ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought
together in our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land.
Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
68. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
69. Id. at 235-39; J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 507-08.
70. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
71. Id. at 641-42.
72. The Court's rhetoric has consistently recognized "the value of voluntary
compliance" in the area of civil rights. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,476 U.S. 267, 290 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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compared with a surrounding workforce in Gramercy
Louisiana that was 39% black).74 The Court upheld a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement reserving
for black employees 50% of the openings in the plant's crafttraining program until parity was reached." Rejecting
Brian Weber's claim that the provision discriminated
against him as a white man in violation of Title VII, Justice
Brennan observed:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so
long" constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary,
private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of
6
racial segregation and hierarchy.

In cases where employers or labor unions stubbornly
resisted court orders requiring non-discriminatory selection,
courts have mandated their own minority preferences. In
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC,7 for
example, the district court, frustrated with the Union's
years of "bad faith attempts to prevent or delay" the
admission of minority members, imposed a remedial goal of
29% nonwhite membership, based on the representation of
minorities in the local workforce. 78 Rejecting the argument
pressed by President Reagan's Solicitor General Charles
Fried that Title VII forbad preferential relief to anyone but
an actual identifiable victim of past discrimination,7 9 Justice
Brennan ruled that race-conscious relief was both necessary
and appropriate in such a case.s0 He underscored that the
preference did not extend to anyone not qualified for
membership in the Union," and that group relief was
74. Id. at 198-99.
75. Id. at 197.
76. Id. at 204 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
77. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
78. Id. at 431-32.
79. Id. at 440.
80. Id. at 476-79, 482-83.
81. Id. at 447-49.
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justified by long-standing mistreatment of the group, and
was realistically the only meaningful remedy in the
circumstances.8 2
Similarly, United States v. Paradise" presented the
courts with a defiant public employer-the Alabama
Department of Public Safety had engaged in four decades of
exclusion of minorities from its state trooper promotional
ranks, followed by twelve years of persistent resistance to
the trial court's remedial decrees. 8 4 When the district court
finally ordered that one black candidate be promoted for
each white candidate to the extent that qualified black
candidates were available, and only until the Department
implemented "an acceptable promotion procedure,"" the
Supreme Court upheld the order by a 5-4 vote. 6 Again,
there was no sacrifice of "standards"-the order stipulated
that all blacks appointed be on the eligible list.87
This latitude for restrained race-sensitivity played itself
8 and
out in the contrasting results in Gratz v. Bollinger"
89
Grutter v. Bollinger, Fisher's predecessors. Applying the
"stringent"90 criteria that minority preferences must be
justified by compelling governmental interest 9' and be
narrowly tailored so as to not unnecessarily displace non82. Brennan took pains to point out that court-ordered affirmative relief is
only permissible to remedy the effects of past discrimination, and not "simply to
create a racially balanced work force." Id. at 475.
83. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
84. Id. at 167-71. In a related case, U.S. District Judge Frank Johnson found
that the state had passed over forty-nine black candidates for clerical positions
who were at the top of their civil service list in order to appoint whites below
them. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1086 (D. Ala. 1970).
85. United States v. Paradise,480 U.S. 149, 153 (1987). None of the entrylevel or promotional exams administered had been validated. Id. at 173 n.3.
86. Id. at 165-66.
87. Id. at 155.
88. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
90. The description originates with Justice O'Connor in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. It is not necessary that there be a specific finding of past discrimination,
as that would undermine the incentive to act. See id. at 289-92.
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minorities, 92 Gratz struck down that portion of the
undergraduate admissions process at the University of
Michigan that awarded a decisive twenty extra index points
based purely on race, which had assured the admission of
virtually all minimally qualified minority applicants. 93
Grutter, on the other hand, permitted the nuanced
weighing of race as a plus-factor in the "highly
individualized, holistic review" 94 of law school applicants, as
per Bakke. Maintenance of a diverse student body was,
Justice O'Connor found, "at the heart of the Law School's
proper institutional mission," and thus a compelling
interest. 95 Diversity, she concluded, promotes cross-racial
understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes,
better prepares students for an increasingly diverse work
force in the global marketplace, and opens the path to
leadership to talented individuals of every race and
ethnicity. 96
Race-conscious programs thus continued to meet with
Supreme Court approval as of 2003. But Sandra Day
O'Connor would soon be replaced by Samuel Alito, who got
his start in the archconservative Reagan Justice
Department, personally opposed racial preferences, and
even reportedly was a member of the Concerned Alumni of
Princeton, which vigorously opposed the university's
affirmative action program.9 7 Alito would join Chief Justice
John Roberts, his former colleague at Justice, Clarence
Thomas, another Reagan alumnus, as well as Antonin
Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, both Reagan appointees.
They would bring to fruition the anti-civil rights agenda

92. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
93. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-76. As Justice Souter pointed out, non-minority
students could also be awarded twenty points for athletic ability or
socioeconomic disadvantage. Id. at 294-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
94. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
95. Id. at 329.
96. Id. at 330-32.
97. See Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege,supra note 12, at 180 n.138; see
also SOTOMAYOR, supra note 9, at 145.
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that had been initiated twenty years before by the 40th
President of the United States.
II. THE "REAGAN REVOLUTION"98

Ronald Reagan's election as President in 1980
dramatically changed the national conversation about civil
rights and race, and the demise of affirmative action can
clearly be traced to his Administration. Symbolically, he
had launched his campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi,
site of the infamous killing of three civil rights workers in
the summer of 1964, and there promised that, if elected, he
would restore "states' rights."99
Dubbed the "Great Communicator," Reagan was adept
at portraying "color-blindness" as the only truly American
course: "The promise in the Declaration of Independence,
that we are endowed by our creator with certain inalienable
rights, was meant for all of us. It was not meant to be
limited or perverted by special privilege, or by double
standards that favor one group over another."00 Reagan's
Justice Department accordingly abruptly switched sides in
the affirmative action cases.
Articulating a novel vision in which white males are the
real victims of societal discrimination, and minorities and
women the unjust beneficiaries, Attorney General Edwin
Meese targeted the preferences established in decades of
federal court litigation that had finally resulted in
significant increases in non-white representation in public
employment (particularly public safety) around the
0 William Bradford Reynolds, chief of the Civil
nation.o'
98. The phrase is taken from Solicitor General Charles Fried's memoir.
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND
FIRSTHAND AccoUNT (1992).

LAw:

ARGUING

THE REAGAN

REVOLUTION-A

99. See Jack White, Lott, Reagan, and Republican Racism, TIME, (Dec. 14,
2002), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,399921,00.html.
100. Ronald Reagan, Speech to the American Bar Association, quoted in
WOLTERS, supra note 35, at 2.
101. See Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The
Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second
Reconstruction,31 B.C. L. REV. 1, 19 n.99 (1989).
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Rights Division, initiated an aggressive campaign to undo
the hundreds of consent decrees that had been negotiated
by his predecessors, sending letters to municipalities
warning that race-conscious preference had to be strictly
limited to actual identifiable victims of discrimination,
meaning of course an end to the concept of affirmative

action.102
In city after city, the Justice Department joined with
white firefighters and police officers to reverse the gains
made by their minority competitors. In Boston, it supported
five white police officers in their unsuccessful challenge to
the promotion of a black officer who scored lower than they
did on the civil service exam. 0 3 In Birmingham, Buffalo,
Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Washington D.C., the
Government's lawyers weighed in against long-standing
goals
and
timetables
for
minority
and
female
advancement.'4 When they appeared in Indianapolis, the
Republican Mayor complained bitterly in a letter to
Attorney General Meese that "[t]he Justice Department's
actions have sown the seeds of discord and contributed to
creating a condition of racial tension and strife where none
existed before." 0 5
The new position was pressed upon the Supreme Court
by Reynolds, Solicitor General Fried, and his deputy
Samuel Alito, who joined with the white-dominated unions
in opposing preferences in Local No. 93, International
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C v. City of
Cleveland, noted above, and Firefighters Local Union
06
No.1784 v. Stotts.1
Stotts was the first successful challenge

102. WOLTERS, supranote 35, at 239-42; Brodin, Reflections, supra note 101, at
23 & n.113; Howard Kurtz, Judge Repulses U.S. Attempt to Undo Affirmative
Action, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1985, at A4.
103. Robert Pear, Repercussions Seen in Affirmative Action Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1986, at A7.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. For Stotts, Reynolds provided support on the brief. Two years later,
Reynolds argued Local No. 93 for the United States as amicus curiae with
support on the brief from Fried and Alito. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
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to a minority preference against layoff designed to preserve
the gains made under a prior consent decree, but which
interfered with seniority rights of white incumbents.' 07
New York Times columnist Tom Wicker lamented that
the Justice Department had "flatly reversed the policy on
'affirmative action' that had been developed by predecessor
departments under two Republican and two Democratic
Presidents.""os Reagan's appointee to chair the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Clarence
Thomas, fell in line with the Administration's new "reverse
bias" agenda. 0 9
The campaign culminated in Birmingham, Alabama, a
majority-black city dubbed "Bombingham" because of its
fierce and violent resistance to civil rights protests in the
1950s and 1960s."o In December 1985, Government lawyers
went to trial in federal district court in support of white
male Birmingham firefighters who challenged the
department's affirmative action decree."' It mattered not
that the goals for advancement of blacks and women had
Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
107. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784, 467 U.S. at 583. Memphis, facing a
court challenge to its nearly all-white fire department in a city 37% African
American, had entered into the decree (modeled on an earlier one negotiated by
the Justice department in 1974) setting an interim goal of filling 50% of fire
department vacancies with qualified minorities. Id. at 566-67. Budgetary cuts in
1981 forced layoffs. Id. Under the City's last hired-first fired seniority system,
the district court found the proposed layoffs "would have a devastating and
retrogressive effect on minority employment," and it enjoined the layoffs. Stotts
v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd 467 U.S. 561
(1984). The Supreme Court overturned the order, applying the seniority proviso
of Title VII, §703(h), which immunizes seniority systems from challenge absent
proof of intentional discrimination. FirefightersLocal Union No. 1784, 467 U.S.
at 577; see also Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining
Discrimination:The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943,
944-49 (1984).
108. Tom Wicker, One Voice, in Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22 1983, at A31.
109. See CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON 148-49 (2007).
110. See DIAN MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA:
CLIMATIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2001).

THE

111. Associated Press, U.S. Opens Its Case in Favor of Promoting White
Firemen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1985, at A22.

2014]

FRAUDULENT CASE

257

been written by their predecessors just four years before. It
was a new day-Reagan's campaign theme "Morning in
America." Playing to the backlash of "angry white men" had
become a winning political strategy."2
When the Supreme Court ultimately sided with the
Reagan Administration in 1989,113 one newspaper account
poignantly noted: "It was heavy with symbolism for blacks
striving for a place in a department recalled for turning fire
hoses on civil rights protestors."ll 4 Martin v. Wilks signaled
a turning point in the narrative of race preference, most
notably opening final decrees already on the books to
collateral challenge by disgruntled whites, in blatant
contradiction of finality doctrine that had been so vigorously
championed by the same conservative justices, particularly
Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the opinion."' No longer
need incumbents intervene to preserve their privileged
status in the workplace-they could now sit out the original
discrimination case and then, without any time limits, file
their "reverse discrimination" action attacking the remedy
instituted.
Justice Scalia even offered them an open invitation in
another case decided that Term: "An intervenor of the sort
before us here is particularly welcome, since we have
stressed the necessity of protecting, in Title VII litigation,
112. Some attributed the Republican sweep of the congressional election in
1994 to the backlash of white male voters, particularly regarding the affirmative
action programs of the Clinton Administration. See Linda Chavez, From
Unequal Opportunity to Equal Results, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1996 (reviewing
ROBERT ZELNICK, BACKFIRE: A REPORTER'S LOOK AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996)).
Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, ran a successful campaign
for reelection in 1990 against an African-American opponent by running the
infamous TV advertisement showing the hands of a white man opening and
then crumpling a rejection letter. The voice-over: "You needed that job, and you
were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial
quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is." A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et
al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial
Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1598 (1994).
113. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
114. Frank J. Murray, Supreme Court Declines to Upset No-Quotas Ruling:
Whites Beat Affirmative Action, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at Al.
115. See Brodin, Reflections, supra note 101, at 22 n.111.
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[white] employees

16

One civil rights lawyer observed that Martin v. Wilks
made "it extremely difficult to litigate, much less conclude,
employment discrimination lawsuits, because [bringing in
all potentially affected parties, the new mandate placed
upon plaintiffs] is not really feasible in the real world in
many of these cases and that is the only avenue that the
court will accept for precluding subsequent litigation of the
same issue."" 7 Additionally, the Court had removed the
incentive for employers to enter consent decrees, as they no
longer would conclusively resolve the litigation."
Although the collateral attack opening was later
overturned by Congress," 9 Martin v. Wilks precipitated an
immediate onslaught of "reverse discrimination" challenges
to carefully-worked out consent decrees long in effect in
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago (five lawsuits), Cincinnati,
and
Francisco,
San
Omaha,
Oakland,
Memphis,
elsewhere.12 0 The Washington Post regretted "the chaos of
interminable litigation" engendered by the decision.121 With
the assistance of the Justice Department, the white
prevailed,
ultimately
firefighters
in
Birmingham
overturning the 1981 consent decree that had begun to

116. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 764 (1989)
(quoting Int'l Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977)).
117. Al Kamen, Bias Suits By Whites Bolstered; Split Court Eases Way For
Challenges To Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, June 13, 1989, at Al, A4
(quoting Benna Ruth Solomon).
118. Id.
119. Congress limited the rights of non-parties to challenge consent decrees by
barring litigants who knew of the proposed decree or who were adequately
represented by the original parties. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(n) (1994)).
120. See WOLTERS, supra note 35, at 279; Robert Pear, 1989 Ruling Spurs New
Tack in Civil Rights Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1990, at Al, A16.
121. Editorial, Setback By A Slim Majority, WASH. POST, June 14, 1989, at
A22.
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integrate the ranks in the fire department.12 2 The Mayor
complained that his city had spent "more than a million
dollars in lawyers' fees" in its unsuccessful defense.123
"There was a time," a St. PetersburgTimes editorial on
Martin v. Wilks read:
when those Americans who had been denied basic human rights
supposedly guaranteed under our Constitution looked to the
Supreme Court as the ultimate protector of their aspirations.
There was even a time when the Republican Party was a symbol
of equal rights for every American. Those traditions are being
systematically trashed by a politicized court whose emerging
majority was chosen for the express purpose of providing a false
legitimacy to a reactionary social agenda.124

Benjamin Hooks, head of the NAACP, regretted "the
unraveling of [civil rights] gains we thought were secure,"
calling the decision "another reminder of the Reagan legacy
[that] will haunt this nation for years."1 2 5
Indeed, since the mid-1980s, the restriction of
affirmative action by an increasingly conservative federal
judiciary has been relentless, anachronistically equating
race-conscious remedial action with the most egregious
forms of actual discrimination from our Nation's past. As
Clarence Thomas, leader of the charge, put it in his
concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,126 striking down
voluntary school desegregation plans in Seattle and
Louisville:
Disfavoring a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution, the
dissent would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on
the basis of race-an approach reminiscent of that advocated by
122. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 20
F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court denied review. 514 U.S. 1065
(1995).

123. Pear, supra note 120, at A16.
124. Editorial, Civil Rights in Reverse, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 15, 1989,
at A16.
125. Charles Mohr, Minority Advocates Fear Gains Will Be Lost, N.Y. TIMES,

June 13, 1989, at B5.
126. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half
century ago....

Indeed, if our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to
beware of elites bearing racial theories. [citing Dred Scott v.

Sanford]. 127

Incongruously, it is deemed "irrelevant whether a
government's racial classifications are drawn by those who
wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire
to help those thought to be disadvantaged." 28 Two of our
most distinguished circuit court judges, neither a liberal,
have taken sharp issue with this proposition. Both Alex
Kozinski and Michael Boudin have stated the obvious, i.e.,
that bona fide affirmative action programs are not "aimed at
oppressing" anyone, do not "seek to give one racial group an
edge over another," and are "far from the original evils at

127. Id. at 748, 780-81 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas is fond of invoking

the Brown v. Board of Education analogy, as in Grutter v. Bollingerwhen urging
the Court to show the same courage in ending affirmative action that it did
when prohibiting segregated schools. 539 U.S. 306, 370-71 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He ramps up the rhetoric in Fisher,
as we will see below.
Other Justices signed on to the equation. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (stating the Equal
Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny of any racial classification, regardless
of "the race of those burdened or benefitted"); Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (Powell, J.) ("[T]he level of scrutiny does not
change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group
that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination."); see also
Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege,supra note 12, at 164.
Justice Scalia has gone a step further, asserting that the disparate impact
prohibition of Title VII, mandating that employers avoid utilizing unnecessary
barriers to minority or female employment opportunities with non-job-related
requirements, violates the equal protection rights of white employees. Ricci v.
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Brodin,

Triumph of White Privilege,supranote 12, at 180.
128. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 759 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inv. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)). This view can
actually be traced to Justice Powell's singular opinion in Bakke. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298-99 (1978).
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which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed."'2 9
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter and Ginsburg have been
perplexed and disturbed by the refusal of their colleagues to
see this distinction, as emphasized in their dissents in

ParentsInvolved.130
Breyer,
recognizing
the obvious
"constitutional
asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that
which seeks to include members of minority races," feared
the decision would spur a "disruptive round" of litigations
challenging other efforts at integration. 3 ' He soundly
rejected the "cruel distortion" to compare Jim Crow
segregation, "a caste system rooted in the institutions of
slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination," with
remedial race-conscious efforts.13 2
The simple-minded view that any racial classification is
per se harmful and thus illegal, no matter the motivation,
can only prevail if one totally ignores the markedly different
context between racially-hostile conduct and race-conscious
129. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev'd, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (quoting Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm, 418 F.3d 1, 27-29 (1st Cir. 2005)
(Boudin, C.J., concurring)).
130. Justice Stevens took particular umbrage at the "cruel irony" of the Chief
Justice relying on Brown v. Board of Education to strike down desegregation
plans. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
lamented his "firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975
would have agreed with today's decision." Id. at 803.
Stevens had begun the debate years earlier when he asserted:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of
oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the
power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 803, 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Actions
designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly
ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination
and its aftereffects have been extirpated.").
132. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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curatives,133 as well as the profound difference in the
psychological effect of each on the "victims." Can it seriously
be contended that turning away a white male because of a
preference in favor of diversity carries the same baggage as
rejecting a black or female applicant because of offensive
stereotypical views about their demographic? The "stigma of
inferiority" associated with white-on-black discrimination
is, of course, absent in the reverse context. 3 4 Concededly,
the rejected white candidate may feel a sense of unfairness,
but the ugly legacy of Jim Crow is not dredged up and
relived.
The sensible dichotomy exemplified by Sandra Day
O'Connor's distinction between classifications that are
"benign" and "remedial" and those that are "in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics"' has given way to a cynical false
equivalency. It would be like equating a physician's
amputation of a gangrenous finger to save the patient with
a torturer's slashing it off to inflict pain; or equating
Lawrence Olivier's torturous drilling of Dustin Hoffman's
teeth ("Is it safe?") in the 1976 suspense film Marathon
Man3 6 with the routine filling of cavities.
The opponents of race-conscious efforts at inclusion are
fond of invoking civil rights icons Thurgood Marshall and
Martin Luther King to support their notion of a "color-blind"

133. Professor Ely aptly refers to such remedial efforts as 'benign'
discrimination," where motivation is not suspect. See Ely, supranote 42, at 724.
Any minority preference will, of course, reduce the number of spaces for nonminorities in a zero-sum game, and thus in that sense is not benign for those
displaced. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 333 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). But Ely argues that it is not "suspect" in a constitutional sense for
the white majority to discriminate against itself in favor of the black minority,
and thus "special scrutiny" is not appropriate. Moreover, the clear purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect blacks from discrimination by
whites, and not the other way around. Ely, supranote 42, at 727-28.
134. See Ely, supranote 42, at 730 n.36.
135. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
136.

MARATHON MAN

(Paramount Pictures 1976).
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Constitution,'
but to do so they must wrench the
statements from their historical context.
Another favorite theme is that affirmative action
stigmatizes the very persons it is designed to benefit, by
identifying them as "affirmative action" hires or admits, and
it reinforces in them self-doubt about their worth. "These
programs," Clarence Thomas asserts, "stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled'
to preferences."'38 Professor Stephen Carter agrees that
black professionals come with a "WARNING! AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION BABY! Do NOT ASSUME THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS

QUALIFIED!"' 3 9 Yet Carter acknowledges that he would not

have accomplished what he has in his career without the
benefit of some preference at the outset.140
Finally, critics argue that beneficiaries of admissions
preferences become its victims as "mismatches" placed at
highly competitive institutions they are unprepared for, and
cannot succeed at.141 The empirical and anecdotal data

refutes this.14 2
137. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 772 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Mly view [of the color-blind
Constitution] was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown.").
138. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(internal citation omitted). Early on during his college years, Thomas concluded
that preferential policies caused him great harm. See THOMAS, supra note 109,
at 56-57. At Yale Law School, he felt he was being judged below par as an
apparent affirmative action admit. Id. at 74-75. Thomas thus turned
vehemently against such programs. See id.; ANDREW PAYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE
THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 142 (2001). For a collection of similar critical views of
affirmative action, see WOLTERS, supranote 35, at 188-93.
139. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 2
(1991).
140. Id. at 5, 11.
141. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2432 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter,539 U.S. at 371-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 46, at 59-68, 114-15, 142-44, 258-65. "It is
time, therefore, to abandon the idea that well-intentioned college and university
admissions officers have somehow sacrificed the interests of the black students
whom they have admitted [regarding graduation rates, advanced degrees, and
subsequent earnings]." Id. at 216.
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This is the past as prologue 43 to the decision in Fisher v.
University of Texas, in which seven members of the Court
align themselves with the new paradigm that subjects good
faith efforts towards inclusion to the same exacting judicial
scrutiny as malevolently motivated acts of subordination.
Purporting to merely remand, the decision more likely will
close the circle on "affirmative action," at last achieving the
"Reagan Revolution" agenda.
III. FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
Abigail Fisher fit the pattern of many reverse
discrimination plaintiffs in that it is not at all clear that she
was the victim of affirmative action so much as her lessthan-stellar record.'" Graduating eighty-second in a high
school class of 674 (and thus not admitted under Texas's
Top Ten Percent Law), and with an 1180 (out of 1600) on
her SATs (below the 80th percentile),145 Fisher was unlikely
143. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. 1.

144. Barbara Grutter's 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT would likely have gotten her
rejected in any event. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. Jennifer Gratz was also
probably rejected because of her admissions numbers. See Liu, supra note 15, at
1073.
Similarly neither the rejections of Marco Defunis nor Alan Bakke, plaintiffs in
the earlier cases, can be clearly tied to minority preference. See HOWARD BALL,
THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 39, 54-56 (2000).
The University of California, Davis inexplicably conceded at the Supreme Court
its inability to prove Bakke would not have been admitted even in the absence of
the special admissions program. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
280 (1978). Despite Bakke's impressive GPA and MCAT scores, the chairman of
the admissions committee who interviewed him reported he was "'rather limited
in his approach' to the problems of the medical profession." See Liu, supra note
15, at 1052 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277); Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of
Delusion:Bakke, Fisherand the Case for a New Affirmative Action 41-42 (Loyola
Univ. Chicago Sch. of Law, Paper No. 2013-022), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2312630#%23. The University's original position in
the trial court was that he would not have been admitted in any event, and the
trial court so found. See Liu, supra note 15, at 1056-57. Why the University
abandoned that defense is unclear. Bakke was also rejected at ten other medical
schools to which he applied. Id. at 1094.
145. Amended Complaint, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d
587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS), aff'd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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to be admitted. She was one of 16,000 students falling
outside the top ten percent group that were competing for a
mere 1,216 seats in the class. 146
The University of Texas ("UT") argued accordingly that
Fisher lacked standing to bring the action, a matter raised
by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor early in the oral
argument.147 Fisher's attorney cleverly structured her
challenge around the assertion that she had a constitutional
right to be judged by race neutral standards,
notwithstanding her particular admissions profile.148 Oddly,
146. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217, 241 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated, 113 S.Ct. 2411 (2013); see Nikole Hannah-Jones, Race Didn't Cost
Abigail Fisher her Spot at the University of Texas, THE WIRE (Mar. 18, 2013,
4:10PM),
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/03/abigail-fisheruniversity-texas/63247/; Mike Tolson, Supreme Court Could Decide Future of
Affirmative Action in University of Texas Reverse DiscriminationCase, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/10/suprememcourt-could-decide-future-of-affirmative-action-in-university-of-texas-reversediscrimination-casel.
147. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 113
S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). The Fifth Circuit, noting that Abigail Fisher
made no class claim, was already enrolled at another institution, and denied
any intention to reapply to UT, found she had standing only to challenge her
rejection and to seek money damages, but not to seek forward-looking injunctive
or declaratory relief. Fisher,631 F.3d at 217.
In Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999), the Court dismissed for lack of standing
an applicant's similar challenge to a race-conscious Ph.D. preference because he
would not have been selected in any event. Id. at 21-22. "Simply put, where a
plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an
impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have
made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury." Id. at 21.
The Court went on, however, to note: "Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an
ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not
affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were
not considered. The relevant injury in such cases is the inability to compete on
an equal footing." Id. (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors
of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
148. See Ronald Dworkin, The Case Against Color-Blind Admissions, NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2012, at 42. Chief Justice Rehnquist, an
architect of the restrictive standing doctrine established in past decades, had
accepted this argument for the Court in Gratz v. Bollinger (over the strong
dissents of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg), conferring standing to sue
on a plaintiff who had not even applied for admission. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S., 244, 260-63 (2003). The Court's out-of-character open door policy was also
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Justice Kennedy's opinion makes no mention of the
standing problem.
In fact there were 168 minority applicants with higher
index numbers than Fisher who were also denied
admission.149 Moreover, it is in the nature of competitive
university admissions that even high index numbers do not
assure admission any more than low numbers automatically
disqualify the applicant.5 0 The process is far too complex
and nuanced to reliably predict results. Indeed, one writer
has concluded that statistically, minority preferences and
rejection of white applicants "are largely independent
events, improperly linked through the causation fallacy." 5'
Yet Fisher considered admission a matter of right, since
her father and sister had attended UT, and, as she put it, "I
took a ton of AP classes, I studied hard and did my
homework-and I made the honor roll. . . . I was in

extracurricular activities. I played the cello and was in
math club, and I volunteered. I put in the work I thought
was necessary to get into UT." 52 Recent Court decisions

on display in Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors
v. Jacksonville. 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) ("When the government erects a
barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit
than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking
to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit
but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The 'injury in fact' in an equal
protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.").
No such welcome was shown the media and human rights organizations seeking
to challenge the extensive surveillance of electronic communications under the
FISA amendments; their case was dismissed because they were unable to prove
they had been covertly monitored. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S.Ct. 1138,
1142-43 (2013).
149. Hannah-Jones, supranote 146.
150. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
151. Liu, supranote 15, at 1049.
152. Tolson, supra note 146. Her sentiments are strikingly similar to those of
reverse discrimination plaintiff Frank Ricci, who asserted he had earned his
promotion in the New Haven Fire Department by virtue of having studied more
than ten hours a day and invested $1,000 in exam preparation materials. See
Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege,supranote 12, at 203.
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have encouraged such entitlement thinking among reverse
discrimination plaintiffs.'I"
Aided by anti-affirmative action activist Edward Blum,
who secured counsel for her, 5 4 Fisher challenged the
admissions policy that UT had adopted after Hopwood v.
Texas,' 5 in which the Fifth Circuit had ruled the explicit
application of more lenient Law School Admission Test
("LSAT") and grade point average ("GPA") standards for
minorities unconstitutional. 5 6 The years after Hopwood had
witnessed a dramatic decrease in minority applicants and
enrollment at UT.'157 By the time Fisher applied in 2008,
UT's selection process had been re-tailored to comply with
the newer regime of Grutter.
Complicating the admissions procedure was the Top
Ten Percent Law ("TTPL"), which the Texas legislature
adopted in 1997 in response to Hopwood, granting
automatic admission to the state university system to high
153. Justice Kennedy's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano fashioned an
unprecedented entitlement to promotion for the white firefighters who had aced
the exam. See Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege, supra note 12, at 175.
Kennedy conveniently overlooked the exam's stark lack of job relation, as well
as prior decisions that had recognized that while incumbent employees like Ricci
may not have been perpetrators of the past discriminatory policies of their
employers (the New Haven Fire Department had several discrimination
findings against it), they were certainly beneficiaries in that their competition
was artificially limited to one race and gender. See Franks v. Bowman Transp.

Co., 424 U.S. 747, 768 (1976).
154. See Morgan Smith, One Man Standing Against Race-Based Laws, N.Y
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/us/edward-blumand-the-project-on-fair-representation-head-to-the-supreme-court-to-fight-racebased-laws.html?pagewanted=all; Hannah-Jones, supra note 146. Blum was
also the instigator of the successful challenge to Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013); Ari Berman,
Conservatives Take Aim At Voting Rights, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2013, at 12.
Blum, who has arranged at least a dozen lawsuits challenging race-based
policies, "matches local plaintiffs with powerful Washington attorneys, paying
the legal fees thanks to generous donations from the biggest funders in the
conservative movement [including the Koch brothers]." Id. at 14.
TIMES,

155. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 934-35.
157. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated, 113 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
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school seniors graduating in the top ten percent of their
class.'
Although this program significantly increased
minority enrollment, given the segregated nature of many
Texas high schools,5 9 the University sought a still higher
"critical mass" of underrepresented minorities, and in that
effort added a "soft variable" component to the review of
non-TTPL applicants like Abigail Fisher.160 In addition to
the traditional Academic Index of GPA and SAT, they were
also evaluated on a Personal Achievement Index that looked
at "special circumstances" such as socioeconomic status'6'
and race. Race was an unquantifiable but significant factor
in the calculus.162 There were no quotas, and no automatic

158. Id.
159. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg observed that "the only way [the Top Ten plan]
works is if you have heavily separated schools. And worse than that, . . . if you
want to go to the University of Texas under the 10 percent plan, you go to the
low-performing school, you don't take challenging courses, because that's how
you'll get into the 10 percent. So maybe the University is concerned that that is
an inadequate way to deal with it." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
147, at 24.
160. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 593-95, 601-09
(W.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded by
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
161. As Professor Jewel notes:
One of the most resonant criticisms of affirmative action is that it
primarily benefits minorities with high SES [(socio-economic status)]
and does very little for anyone, minority or majority, from the lower
rungs of the social hierarchy. In response to this concern, race-blind
affirmative action models that use SES factors to achieve diversity have
gained traction.
Jewel, supra note 54, at 249.
162. Because an applicant's race is identified at the front of the admissions
file, reviewers are aware of it throughout the evaluation. Race in and of
itself does not affect the score but is instead used to place the student's
achievements into context and reveal whether she possesses a valuable
'sense of cultural awareness.' Used in this manner, it can positively
impact applicants of all races, including Caucasian, or may have no
impact whatsoever.
Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (W.D. Tex. 2009), affd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.
2011), vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). "At no point in the
process is race considered individually or given a numerical value." Id. at 608.
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predetermined bonus for race;16 instead, the program was
1 6"which Justice
modeled on the one approved of in Grutter,
O'Connor famously suggested should be good law for

twenty-five years.16 5
The actual number of applicants admitted by virtue of
factoring in their race could not be determined with
precision, but by any account was modest.166 For 2008, UT
received 29,501 applications, admitted 12,843, and enrolled
6,718. Approximately 58 black and 158 Hispanic students
were admitted by way of the holistic review, representing
20% of the total black students admitted and 15% of the
Hispanics.167 The 58 black admittees represented merely
merely 0.92% of the enrolling in-state freshman class.16 It

163. Id. at 235. "Indeed, UT's policy improves upon the program approved in
Grutter because the University does not keep an ongoing tally of the racial
composition of the entering class during its admissions process." Id.
164. Fisher,645 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95, 609-10.
165. Grutter,539 U.S. at 342-43.
166. The program appears to have doubled the African Americans in the
entering class from 165 to 335, Hispanics from 762 to 1,228, and Asian
Americans from 1,034 to 1,126. Under the Top Ten Percent Law, African
Americans had numbered only 275 and Hispanics 1,024 in the fall class. Fisher,
631 F.3d at 226.
The number of positions at issue in many of the major reverse discrimination
cases seems hardly worth the long and expensive road to the Supreme Court. In
United States v. Paradise,480 U.S. 149 (1987), for example, Solicitor General
Charles Fried and Civil Rights Chief William Bradford Reynolds chose to
challenge a lower court order for priority hiring even though it meant eight
blacks instead of four would be promoted to corporal in the Alabama Highway
Patrol. See WOLTERS, supra note 35, at 259. In DeFunis, the Law School
reported an enrollment of eight black students out of a total of 356,
approximately 2.2%, compared to a percentage of blacks in the population of
Washington of approximately 2.1%. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 326-27
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
167. Brief for Respondents at 38, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3245488, at *48.
168. For these statistics, see Brief for Petitioner at 39-40, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759, at *51-52;
Brief for Respondents, supranote 167. For current UT admissions statistics, see
2013 Freshman Profile, UNIv. TEX. AT AuSTIN, http://bealonghorn.utexas.edul
whyut/profile/app-to-enroll (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
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was not possible to isolate the role of race in the
individualized decisions.
Ironically, plaintiff Fisher used the fact that UT's
program produced "only minimal gains in the enrollment of
under-represented minorities" as one of her grounds for
challenging it, contending "the outcomes were so small, that
there were readily available alternatives."'6 9 Both the
district and circuit courts viewed it instead as evidence that
the program was "narrowly tailored" to achieve its diversity
purpose.7 0 Justice Kennedy tellingly asked during oral
argument: "[I]f it's so few [minority admits], then what's the
problem?"' 7 1
Fifth Circuit Judge Emilio Garza, however, questioned
whether this small increment in minority enrollment
justified the cost of race-conscious decisions, which he
viewed as "an evil" in itself.'72 While there are "no de
minimis violations of the Equal Protection Clause," he
asserted, there are de minimus benefits against which racesensitive decisions cannot be justified: "[WIhen government
undertakes any level of race-based social engineering, the
costs are enormous. Not only are race-based policies
inherently divisive, they reinforce stereotypes that groups of
people, because of their race, gender, or ethnicity, think

169. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 609; Fisher,631 F.3d at 235, 246; Transcript of
Oral Argument, supranote 147, at 28.
170. Fisher,631 F.3d at 246-47.
171. Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 147, at 22.
172. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 264 (Garza, J., concurring). For him, UT's program
failed to achieve "its intended goal of increasing racial diversity." Id. at 260. By
his estimates, the holistic process yielded an additional fifteen AfricanAmerican and forty Hispanic students, and thus no discernible educational
impact. Id. at 262.
In her dissent to the denial of an en banc rehearing, Chief Judge Edith Jones
also emphasized this point: the fact that the racial preference admits "amounted
to no more than a couple hundred out of more than six thousand new students"
demonstrated that the racial classification was "especially arbitrary" given its
minimal impact. This "additional diversity contribution" could hardly be deemed
"indispensable" and thus served no compelling interest. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (denying
rehearing).
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alike or have common life experiences." 7 1 "[N]arrow
tailoring requires not only that the preferences not be too
large, but also that they not be too small so as to fail to
achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government

interest." 74
Judge Garza also hit on another perceived vulnerability
of the UT program: its indefinable goal of achieving a
"critical mass" of minorities at the program and classroom
level.17 For him, this was "race-based social engineering" at
a "level of granularity" that clearly exceeded constitutional
parameters, with "no logical stopping point."' 6 Chief Judge
Edith Jones elaborated:
The pernicious impact of aspiring to or measuring "diversity" at
the classroom level seems obvious upon reflection. Will the
University accept this "goal" as carte blanche to add minorities
until a "critical mass" chooses nuclear physics as a major? Will
classroom diversity "suffer" in areas like applied math,
kinesiology, chemistry, Farsi, or hundreds of other subjects if, by
chance, few or no students of a certain race are enrolled? [UT]
opens the door to effective quotas in undergraduate majors in
which certain minority students are perceived to be
"underrepresented."17 7

Notwithstanding these reservations, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to

173. Fisher,631 F.3d at 264 (Garza, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 259-60 (citation omitted). This "minimal effects" argument had
prevailed in the successful challenge to the voluntary desegregation plans in
ParentsInvolved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).

175. District Judge Sam Sparks, however, specifically found that UT's
program did not seek to achieve diversity in every single class, as that would of
course be unworkable. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587,
607 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded
by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
176. Fisher,631 F. 3d at 254 (Garza, J., concurring). For a description of the
classroom focus, see Fisher,645 F. Supp. 2d at 602-03, 607-08.
177. Fisher, 644 F.3d at 307 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (rehearing denied).
Justice Scalia questioned how classroom diversity could be measured accurately,
given that applicants self-identify themselves as to race, and there is no check.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 34-36.
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UT, 75 affording "due deference" to the university's
educational judgment that its individualized, flexible, and
holistic admissions procedures were supported by a
compelling interest in achieving diversity and were
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.179 No evidence
was found to "call[] into question [UT's] good faith."' 0 And
the Top Ten Percent race-neutral alternative was unable to
fully achieve the diversity the University sought.'"'
Certiorari review was granted in February 2012.182
At oral argument the following October, the justices
peppered University counsel with Socratic-law-professortype questions about how a university would know when it
had reached the "critical mass" of minorities, and how
"minority" was defined, and what percentage of non-white
blood constituted minority status. Counsel answered the
first question by proposing "critical mass" was the point at
which the minorities no longer felt isolated or reluctant to
speak out; the other questions proved more difficult.'
But when it decided the case on June 24, 2013,184 the
Court left such matters to the lower courts on a second look.
Vacating and remanding, Justice Anthony Kennedy (joined
by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor)8 5
reaffirmed Grutter (which no party had challenged), but
concluded that the Fifth Circuit had failed to hold UT to the
"searching" and "demanding" strict scrutiny mandated by
the earlier precedent, particularly regarding the "narrowly
178. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247 (5th Cir. 2011), aff'g 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587, 613,
rehearingen banc denied, 644 F.3d 301.
179. Fisher,631 F.3d at 231.
180. Id. at 245.
181. See id. at 239-41.
182. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted,132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
183. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 15-16. Chief Justice
Roberts was fond of taunting UT's counsel with questions like "Should someone
who is one-quarter Hispanic check the Hispanic box" when self-identifying?
"What about one-eighth?" Id. at 32-33.
184. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
185. Justice Kagan recused herself. Id. at 2422. The line-up has the look of a
delicate compromise worked at in conference.
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tailored" standard."' The University is entitled to no special
deference and no presumption of good faith, the Court held,
on its substantial burden to establish that each applicant is
evaluated as an individual, that race is not the defining
feature of each application, and that no workable raceneutral alternatives would yield the same educational
benefits of diversity.18 7
Most significantly, and disturbingly, the Court
reaffirmed the equation of efforts to rectify discrimination
with efforts to prolongit:
It is therefore irrelevant that a system of racial preferences in
admissions may seem benign. Any racial classification must meet
strict scrutiny, for when government decisions touch upon an
individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial
determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 88

Drawing
upon
precedents
including
school
desegregation cases and prohibitions on interracial
marriage, Kennedy bunched together all distinctions based
on race or ancestry as "by their very nature odious to a free
people" and "inherently suspect," and therefore subject to
"the most rigid scrutiny.""
But if the purpose of strict scrutiny is to test the
"sincerity" of the reasons advanced in support of a
challenged policy and "to remove the possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
stereotype,"190 can it be seriously contended that the UT
administrators who devised the admissions program were
motivated by bigoted stereotypes of white applicants, the
way segregationists were regarding black school children?'91

186. Id. at 2411, 2415, 2419.
187. Id. at 2419-21.

188. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (internal quotes omitted) (citing Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)).

189. Fisher,133 S. Ct. at 2418-19 (internal quotes omitted).
190. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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Even a dog, the old saying goes, knows the difference
between being kicked and being stumbled over.192
Justices Scalia 93 and Thomas filed concurring opinions
that would overrule Grutter,which Thomas characterized as
a "radical departure," 9 4 and categorically prohibit raceconscious decision-making by the government. Thomas
doubled-down on his insistence that the "Constitution
abhors classifications based on race because every time the
government places citizens on racial registers and makes
race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it
demeans us all." 95 The "Equal Protection Clause strips
States of all authority to use race as a factor in providing
education. All applicants must be treated equally under the
law, and no benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify
racial discrimination."19 6
To Thomas's ear, Grutter's claims for the educational
benefits of a diverse student body sounded like the
discredited rationalizations advanced in support of racial
segregation-that race-mixing would destroy the public
schools and hurt poor black children the most, or that
separate schools for blacks provided more opportunities for
their leadership development.'

On the broader issue of race preference, Thomas has a
simple answer, mocking the "benighted notion that it is
191. As the late Ronald Dworkin put it, forbidden discrimination occurs when
an individual is rejected because "their race is despised or culturally stereotyped
as inferior or unsuited." Dworkin, supra note 148, at 42. But "[n]o one could
rationally suspect that the University of Texas is prejudiced against the white
students who still form almost all of its student body." Id. at 44.
192. This phrase has been attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes. It can be
found in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (45th prtg. 1923).
193. Scalia revealed his deep animosity towards any remedial program
designed to undue the effects of past discrimination when he famously
characterized the Voting Rights Act as a "racial entitlement." See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96),
2013 WL 6908203.
194. Fisher,133 S. Ct. at 2423 (Thomas, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 2422 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. at 2428-29.
197. Id. at 2425-26.
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possible to tell when discrimination helps, rather than
hurts, racial minorities."'9 "The worst forms of racial
discrimination in this Nation [including slavery]," he
pleads, "have always been accompanied by straight-faced
representations that discrimination helped minorities." 99
UT's affirmative action program, for him, follows "in [these]
inauspicious footsteps."2 00
Only Ruth Bader Ginsburg explicitly challenged (in a
footnote at the very end of her dissent) Thomas's assertion
that "all governmental classifications by race, whether
designed to benefit or to burden a historically
disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same
standard of judicial review."2 01 She reprised her theme in
Gratz: "Actions designed to burden groups long denied full
citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures
taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination
and its aftereffects have been extirpated."2 02 Ginsburg found
the UT program in conformity with Bakke and Grutter,and
would uphold it without need for remand.2 03
IV. WHERE DOES FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OFTEXAS LEAVE

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACE-SENSITIVE SELECTION?

Because of its insistence that diversity-conscious
measures are to be subiected to the same exacting scrutiny
as acts of deliberate discrimination, Fisher v. University of
Texas may well turn out to be the death knell of affirmative
action and race-sensitive policies (at least at public
institutions). Although we have come a long way from the
explicit reservation of fixed places (a "quota"204 in anyone's
198. Id.at 2429.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2430.
201. Id. at 2433 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2434.
204. Properly understood, a "quota" is a program in which a certain fixed
number or proportion of opportunities are reserved exclusively for
certain minority groups. Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage
which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded, and insulate the
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view) in a medical school class for minorities, 20 or a raciallyseparate admissions process,2 06 any more sophisticated and
nuanced program is still vulnerable to the intrusive
dissection that Fisher contemplates, especially given the
presumption of illegality raised by the consideration of race
itself. It will not be hard for clever attorneys to pick apart
any process that takes account of race, much in the manner
that Judges Garza, Fine, and Roberts did.
And risk averse university officials may abandon, or at
least scale down, their race-sensitivity in order to avoid the
considerable expense and unwanted media attention of
litigation.2 0 7 Fisher's reversal of summary judgment for the
university suggests that schools must be prepared for fullblown trials in defense of their programs. A Brandeis official
lamented that universities will now be required "to prove a
negative," namely that there is no race-neutral alternative
[such as the Top Ten Percent Law] that would equally
achieve diversity.20 8
In sum, Fisher's most perceptive postscript may have
come from Abigail Fisher herself, who thanked the justices
"for moving the nation closer to the day when a student's
race isn't used at all in college admissions."2 0 9
But the sad reality is that "we are not far distant from
an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats. In contrast, a permissible goal requires only a good-faith effort to
come within a range demarcated by the goal itself, and permits
consideration of race as a 'plus' factor in any given case while still
ensuring that each candidate competes with all other qualified
applicants.
Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) (citations omitted).
205. Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
206. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
207. See Marcella Bombardieri, Court Wants High Bar ForAffirmative Action,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2013, at Al (quoting university officials "puzzling over

whether they are truly in compliance with the [Clourt's standards").
208. Id. Race-neutral alternatives have not proven to be effective substitutes.
See BOWEN & BOK, supranote 46, at 269-74.
209. Quoted in Adam Liptak, Justices Step Up Scrutiny of Race in College
Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013 at Al.
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of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our
communities and schools."2 10 W.E.B. DuBois's famous
prediction that the problem of the twentieth century would
be the problem of the color line has, as John Hope Franklin
aptly observed, equal resonance for our own times.2 1 1
Diversity measures serve many critical societal
purposes. In public safety, license to engage in raceconscious selections among qualified candidates allows
police and fire departments to reflect a cross-section of the
communities they serve, facilitating citizen cooperation and
lending legitimacy to the department's work.2 12 At our
universities, pathways have been created for minority and
female trailblazers, two of whom sit on the Supreme Court.
Clarence Thomas and Sonia Sotomayor both acknowledge
their debt to affirmative action, although they have drawn
dramatically different lessons from their experience with
it. 2 13
Minority graduates of selective professional schools
have formed "the backbone of the emergent black and
Hispanic middle class," "brought greater diversity to the
emergency clinics and surgery rooms of leading hospitals, to
210. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The acquittal of George Zimmerman, admitted killer of unarmed AfricanAmerican teenager Trayvon Martin, is just one of countless examples. Racist
views persist, even among the intelligentsia. See, e.g., DINESH D'SouZA, THE END
OF RACISM: PRINCIPALS FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 525 (1995) (inferior AfricanAmerican culture); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
LAWS
33 (1992) (undesirable
inefficiencies of African-American workers); RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES
MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN
LIFE 276-80 (1994) (asserting the lower intelligence of blacks).
211. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 5 (1993).

212. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chi., 352 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirmative action in police promotions was justified by the operational need for
diversity). But cf. Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 308-10 (3d Cir. 2006)
(goal of racial diversity in city's fire houses did not justify racial balancing
program, where imbalances were the result of permitting firefighters to work in
their own neighborhoods).
213. Compare the very negative view of THOMAS, supra note 109, at 56-57,
with Sotomayor's gratitude for the opening of doors to those with "more talent
than opportunity." SOTOMAYOR, supra note 9, at 119, 145-46, 188-91.
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government offices and law firms, to corporate hierarchies,
and to the practice of entrepreneurship," and have created
their own "networks similar to those that have benefitted
the majority white community for many generations."2 14
Minority medical graduates are much more likely to serve
traditionally underserved communities, and to have
minorities and poor persons among their patients.2 1 5
Studying with classmates of diverse backgrounds
stimulates the learning process, and helps prepare students
for the global marketplace and for leadership in a pluralistic
society. "In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."2 16 This is
why so many "conservative" institutions, in the corporate
world as well as the military, have filed amicus briefs in
favor of race-sensitive selection processes.2 17

214. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 46, at 116. They are more likely than their
white classmates to become involved in civic activities, and to be leaders in
them. See id. at 155-62, 168-73.
215. Id. at 13.
216. Grutter. v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
217. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in
Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 399056
(citing "the crucial role diversity in higher education plays in preparing students
to be the leaders this country needs in business, law, and all other pursuits that
affect the public interest"); Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 399096
("Only a well educated, diverse work force, comprising people who have learned
to work productively and creatively with individuals from a multitude of races
and ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds, can maintain America's
competitiveness in the increasingly diverse and interconnected world
economy."); Consolidated Brief of Lt. General Julius W. Becton, et. al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL
1787554 ("[A] highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and
trained to command our nation's racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to
the military's ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national
security.").
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But, opponents say, what about
"meritocracy" of special preference?

the cost to the

2014]

V. THE MYTH OF "MERIT" AND THE LIE OF
"LOWERING STANDARDS"

The asserted debits of race sensitivity include
stigmatization
of
the
beneficiaries,2 18
"6reverse
discrimination against non-minorities, and the frictions,
backlash, and hostilities that can result from overt weighing
of race and gender. But most often the other side of the
balance against which affirmative action is juxtaposed is
"merit selection."2 19 From elementary school on, and into the
workplace, this usually means standardized testing.
The blithe equation of merit with test results is so
widely accepted that any questioning of it can cause
considerable angst. When the student commencement
speaker at the highly competitive (and nearly all white or
Asian student body) Hunter College High School in
Manhattan expressed his guilt "because I don't deserve any
of this. And neither do any of you. We received an
outstanding education at no charge based solely on our
performance on a [three-hour] test we took when we were
eleven-year-olds," the audience of parents and students was
aghast.22 0 He continued to press on raw nerves:
If you truly believe that the demographics of Hunter represent
the distribution of intelligence in this city, then you must believe
that the Upper West Side, Bayside, and Flushing are intrinsically

218. Justice Thomas makes the point emphatically in Grutter,539 U.S. at 37374 (Thomas J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and Fisher, 133 S. Ct.
2411, 2432 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) that no one can distinguish between
students of color admitted on their own merit and those admitted by affirmative
action, thus tainting the entire group. Extensive surveys of black students and
graduates put Thomas in the minority on this point. See BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 46, at 264-65.
219. For Bowen and Bok, the word "merit" "has taken on so much baggage we
may have to re-invent it or find a substitute." BOWEN & BOK, supra note 46, at
276.
220. HAYES, supra note 47, at 31-34. Interestingly, the teachers gave him a
standing ovation. Id. at 34.
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more intelligent than the South Bronx, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and
Washington Heights, and I refuse to accept that....
We are deciding children's fates before they even had a chance.
We are playing God, and we are losing. Kids are losing the
opportunity to go to college or obtain a career

. . . .

Hunter is

perpetuating a system in which children, who contain unbridled
and untapped intellect and creativity, are discarded like refuse.
And we have the audacity to say they deserved it, because we're
22
smarter than them. 1

Currently, in a city whose public and charter school
population is 71% black and Hispanic, only 12% of the offers
for spots at the elite high schools like Hunter went to those
demographics.222
The genesis of devices like the SAT was laudable"objective meritocratic" substitutes for the subjective
judgments of "character" that had traditionally admitted to
the elite universities boys from old-line WASP families,
while excluding ethnic applicants. 223 But the Educational
Testing Service and its plethora of products have spawned a
new elite-the skilled and highly-prepped test-taker.22 4 And
the correlation between test scores and family income and
socio-economic status is now widely documented.2 25
221. Id. at 33.
222. Leonie Haimson and Diane Ravitch, Unequal Schools, THE NATION, May

6, 2013, at 41, 42.
223. See generally NICHOIAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999). The origins of civil service testing were
equally laudable, but the results equally discriminatory. See Brodin, Triumph of
White Privilege,supranote 12, at 204-06.
224. The prep course for the Hunter High School exam costs $2,550, and
private one-on-one tutoring runs upwards of $90 an hour. HAYES, supra note 47,
at 38-39. As Hayes aptly observes, "[t]he playing field may be level, but certain
kids get to spend nights and weekend practicing on it in advance of the
competition." Id. at 40. Frank Ricci, lead plaintiff in the successful reverse
discrimination case against the New Haven Fire Department, spent more than
$1,000 on test prep materials and was able to devote eight to thirteen hours a
day to studying. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009).
225. Jewel, supra note 54, at 245 n.22 (2012); see also Peter Schmidt, A
History of Legacy Preferences, and Privilege, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE
RICH: PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS, supra note 17, at 33, 46-47;
Deborah C. Malamud, Class-BasedAffirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1847 (1996).
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Regarding the persistent gap between black and white
test scores, Bowen and Bok point to the differences between
the two groups in "resources, environments, and inherited
intellectual capital (the educational attainment of parents
and grandparents)."2 2 6 High-income families reportedly
spend seven times more each year on their children's
education (private tutoring, SAT prep courses, computers,
and other activities)-$9,000 compared to $1,300-than
low-income families. 2 27 "The advantages that money can buy
on tests and college applications have become so great that
they threaten to undermine the American ideal of education
as the great leveler that enables anyone who works hard to
succeed, regardless of income level ....
In sum, what looks like individual achievement may be
the product of economic and educational advantage
transmitted from parent to child.22 9
Recognition of the limitations and distortions of highstakes testing is certainly not new. William 0. Douglas
complained forty years ago:
There was a time when law schools could follow the advice of
Wigmore, who believed that "the way to find out whether a boy
has the makings of a competent lawyer is to see what he can do in
a first year of law studies." . . . But by the 1920s many law schools

found that they could not admit all minimally qualified
applicants, and some selection process began. The pressure to use
226. BOWEN & BOK, supranote 46, at 23.
227. Megan Woolhouse, Wealth Gap Limits Equality of Education, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 5, 2013, at B5 (discussing a report co-authored by MIT economics
professor Michael Greenstone).
228. Id.

229. See Malamud, supra note 225, at 1881 & nn.1303-33. Regarding her
Princeton experience, Sonia Sotomayor observed:
Until we would raise kids of our own, no minority students had alumni
for parents, and rare indeed were those who had not come from poor
communities. The typical undergraduate had been guided to Princeton
by relatives, by prep school guidance counselors, or else by teachers
savvy about the system. Minority kids, however, had no one but their
few immediate predecessors: the first to scale the ivy-colored wall
against the odds, just one step ahead ourselves, we would hold the
ladder steady for the next kid with more talent than opportunity.
SOTOMAYOR, supra note 9, at 146.
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some kind of admissions test mounted, and a number of schools
instituted them .

. .

. [I]n 1948 the LSAT was born. It has been

with us ever since.
The test purports to predict how successful the applicant will be
in his first year of law school, and consists of a few hours' worth of
multiple-choice questions. But the answers the student can give to
a multiple-choice question are limited by the creativity and
intelligence of the test-maker; the student with a better or more
original understanding of the problem than the test-maker may
realize that none of the alternative answers are any good, but
230
there is no way for him to demonstrate his understanding.

The evidence is quite compelling that these paper-andpencil tests (both for admissions and personnel selections)
are not only often inadequate to their task of selecting the
"best" applicants (i.e., they lack validation), 23 1 but also
unfairly biased in their results. 23 2 On the latter point, one
scholar has noted that "the disparate impact of an LSATdriven definition of merit" has overshadowed many
affirmative action programs.2 3 3 It has been reported that in
2011, only forty-seven African-American applicants to law
schools had LSATs above 165 and GPAs above 3.5.234 Does
230. DeFunis v. Odegaard,

416 U.S.

312, 327-28

(1974)

(Douglas, J.,

dissenting). Among the first law schools to rely on the LSAT were Ole Miss and
Tulane, "likely ... as a pretense for maintaining segregation." See Kidder, supra
note 48, at 17. The very notion of "selective admissions" itself at some
universities had its origins in a desire to limit the numbers of Jews and other
immigrant groups admitted. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 369 (2003)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
231. See generally Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege, supra note 12, at 202221; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VALIDITY OF TESTING IN EDUCATION AND
EMPLOYMENT (1993).

232. Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege, supra note 12, at 222-25. For the

persistent difference in scores among demographic groups, see THE BLACKWHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jenks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998);
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 46, at 19-23; William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How
the SAT Creates 'Built-In Headwinds'-An Educational and Legal Analysis of
DisparateImpact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 145-55 (2002).

233. Kidder, supra note 48, at 27.
234. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Diversity, 69 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REV.
193, 196 (2012). In 2000, blacks constituted 11.3% of law school applicants, but
only 1%of all applicants that scored 165 or higher on the LSAT. Grutter, 539
U.S. at 376 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL,
NATIONAL STATISTICAL REPORT (1994)). The black-white gap in SAT scores,
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this mean these were the only applicants of color who could
reasonably be expected to succeed in the profession? Prior to
1968 and the expansion of admissions criteria beyond the
usual standard profile numbers, there were about 200
African Americans graduating from law school annually in
the entire nation.23 5 Were they the only ones in that
demographic qualified to practice law?
As Justice Thomas observed in Grutter,"no modern law
school can claim ignorance of the poor performance of
blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School Admission
test (LSAT)."236 A critic of both standardized testing and the
prevailing definition of "merit," Thomas complained:
The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in
admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that
the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to "merit."
For example, in the national debate on racial discrimination in
higher education admissions, much has been made of the fact that
elite institutions utilize a so-called "legacy" preference to give the
children of alumni an advantage in admissions. This, and other,
exceptions to a "true" meritocracy give the lie to protestations that
merit admissions are in fact the order of the day at the Nation's
universities. 237

The SAT, gatekeeper into higher education, has been
subject to considerable study which "challenges the
conventional wisdom that the SAT accurately measures
merit and fairly reflects group differences in educational
attainment."2 38 The National Center for Fair and Open
Testing concludes that such standardized tests "often
produce results that are inaccurate, inconsistent, and
harmful to minority, low-income, and female students....
[The] tests generally fail to effectively and usefully measure
test takers' achievement, abilities, or skills."2 39 In fact the
although it has narrowed in recent years, remains significant. See Liu, supra
note 15, at 1063-64.
235. Kidder, supranote 48, at 7.
236. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

237. Id. at 367-68.
238. Kidder &Rosner, supra note 231, at 134.
239. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 230, at 119-20. Employment
tests have similarly often been found unreliable when challenged. In one of the
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SAT only marginally predicts college grades, and even less
graduation rates,24 0 and there is evidence that it particularly
under predicts academic performance for females and
minorities. 2 41 For all test takers, the multiple-choice format
itself is incapable of measuring higher order thinking

skills. 2 42
In sum, while the process of admitting university
students operates at a level of complexity that defies easy
characterization, it is a misconception to set off so-called
"merit" criteria against "other considerations," when in
truth the traditional measures are hardly reliable
predictors of success in school or beyond. One writer
contends "objective merit and fairness are attractive
concepts with no basis in reality."24 3 Professor Stephen
Carter thus suggests that we should conceive of affirmative
action as rewritingthe standards for excellence, rather than
preparing people to meet them.2 44
Yet test scores and GPA invariably form the basis of
cases challenging race-conscious programs, as if they were
the gold standard of an applicant's worth.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the relative
success of minorities "in the face of harmful and widespread
stereotypes evidences a degree of drive, determination, and

early revelations, the evidence demonstrated that persons who scored poorly on
the test battery (covering spatial relations, mechanical reasoning, and
arithmetic) for building trades apprenticeship programs could actually perform
the job just as successfully as those who had scored higher. EEOC v. Local 638,
401 F. Supp. 467, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976). The
inability to validate personnel tests has haunted employers since. See cases
collected in Brodin, Triumph of White Privilege,supranote 12, at 208-21.
240. Kidder & Rosner, supranote 231, at 135.
241. See Sharif ex rel. v. N.Y. Educ. Dep't., 709 F. Supp. 345, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); BOWEN & BOK, supranote 46, at 74-75, 276-77.
242. See text accompanying note 229.
243. Schmidt, supra note 225, at 33, 65 (quoting Debra Thomas & Terry
Shepard, Legacy PreferencesAre Defensible, Because the Process Can't Be 'Fair,'
Chron. Higher Educ., Mar. 14, 2003, at B15).
244. CARTER, supra note 139, at 27.
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merit not captured by test scores alone."2 45 Sonia Sotomayor
recalls she "had more ground than most to make up before I
was competing with my classmates on an equal footing. But
I worked relentlessly . . . ."246 She graduated Princeton
summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, and went on to serve on
24 7
the Yale Law Journal.
Character traits like empathy and
altruism, not unimportant in our leaders, similarly escape
the attention of tests and GPAs.2 4 8But ["t]he numbers create
an illusion of difference tending to overwhelm other
factors."2 49
Anticipating the trend towards more "holistic" methods
of selection, William 0. Douglas observed:
A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a
junior college may thereby demonstrate a level of motivation,
perseverance, and ability that would lead a fairminded admissions
committee to conclude that he shows more promise for law study
than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at
Harvard.

. . . There is currently no test available

to the

Admissions Committee that can predict such possibilities with
assurance. 250

Amid the outcry over "quotas" and "preferential
treatment" is lost one salient point-that race-sensitive
policies merely encourage employers and universities, when
choosing among the qualified candidates,to give an edge to
minorities and women. Admissions officers obviously seek
those applicants whom they deem intellectually capable of
245. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated,
133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013); see also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 329 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).

246. SOTOMAYOR, supra note 9, at 191-92 (emphasis added).
247. Id. When asked accusingly why she got into Princeton over higher-ranked
white classmates, Sonia Sotomayor answered: "Because I work part-time during
the school year and full-time during the summers. I may be ranked below them,
but I'm still in the top ten, and I do much more than the others do." Id. at 119.
Referring to her physician brother, she notes: "Affirmative action may have
gotten him into medical school, but it was his own self-discipline, intelligence,
and hard work that saw him through." Id. at 191-92.
248. Jewel, supra note 54, at 317 (2012).

249. DeFunis,416 U.S. at 329 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 328-32.
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completing the program successfully,2 5 ' and they select from
among "the large middle group of applicants who are
'admissible' and deemed capable of doing good work in their
courses."2 52 Diversity goals invariably include a proviso like
that in the University of Washington Law School's
admission program challenged in Defunis: "if there are
2 53
sufficient qualified applicantsavailable."
Schools are choosing among qualified candidates based
on their entire records, and may admit underrepresented
applicants despite somewhat less likelihood of success based
on the traditional measures, recognizing the limited
predictive value and one-dimensional nature of those
measures. 2 54 In fact, when preferences are challenged, it is
typically not on the grounds that the minority admits were
unqualified.2 5 5
Consent decrees in employment discrimination cases
similarly give preferences to qualified minorities and
women. 256 A decree entered in 2012 in a gender
discrimination suit against the Corpus Christi police
department,2 57 where the City conceded that its physical
ability test (which for years had excluded virtually all
female candidates) was not job-related or predictive of
success as a police officer, the City agreed to develop new
251. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 46, at 23.
252. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (citing Univ. of Cal.
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256 (1977)).
253. DeFunis,416 U.S. at 347.
254. See, e.g., id. at 326 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
255. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (no dispute that minority admittees were qualified).
256. An employer .

.

. is unlikely to have an over-compromising attitude

toward affirmative action. Employers recognize. . . that an inequitable
or overly zealous affirmative action plan may create racial tension in
the workplace. The presence of this tension may create dissension and
a general non-productive work climate. This unfortunate, but real
potential for non-minority backlash is a potent disincentive which
restrains employers from agreeing to "too" sweeping affirmative action.
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 555 n.12 (8th Cir. 1982).
257. Second Amended Consent Decree, at 4, 9-12, United States v. City of
Corpus Christi, No. 2:12-cv-00217 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2013).
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selection devices which would reliably screen applicants.
Typically, priority hiring was provided for past victims of
the discriminatory practices who could establish their
qualificationsunder the revised job-related procedures. The
1981 decree against the Birmingham fire department, the
subject of so many years of litigation, stipulated that only
qualifiedblack or female applicants could be advanced. 258
Justice William Brennan addressed the contention that
affirmative action benefits the unqualified25 9 in Johnson v.
Santa Clara Transportation Agency,260 where the public
employer promoted a female over a male as part of an effort
to bring women into supervisory ranks for the first time.
The disgruntled male, who had a civil service score just two
points higher (75 over 73), alleged he was the victim of
reverse discrimination.2 6 1 Rejecting his claim, Brennan
observed:
Justice Scalia's dissent predicts that today's decision will loose a
flood of "less qualified" minorities and women upon the work force

258. Howard Kurtz, U.S. Called Contradictory on Minority-Hiring Stance;
Birmingham Finds Ammunition in Justice Dept. Paper, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
1985, at A2; see supratext accompanying notes 109-14.
259. Carter's Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby includes the following
quotation from Ira Glasser:
I am reminded of a conversation I had some years ago with a veteran
civil rights litigator who, concerned at charges that affirmative action
sometimes results in hiring unqualified candidates, drew a sharp
distinction between unqualified and less qualified. An employer, he
mused, does not have to hire the best person for the job, as long as
everyone is good enough to do the job. Consequently, he reasoned, it is
perfectly fine to require employers to hire black applicants who are less
qualified than some applicants, as long as the black candidates are
capable of doing the job.
CARTER, supranote 139, at 51.

Opponents of affirmative of course argue that employers and universities
sometimes manipulate the bar of "qualified" to accommodate minorities or
women. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 92 (reviewing ROBERT ZELNICK, BACKFIRE:
A REPORTER'S LOOK AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996)). For the charge that
affirmative action leads to "the best black syndrome," see CARTER, supra note
139, at 47-52.
260. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
261. Id. at 623-25.
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. . . . [That speculation] ignores the fact that "[it] is a standard

tenet of personnel administration that there is rarely a single,
'best qualified' person for a job. An effective personnel system will
bring before the selecting official several fully-qualified candidates
who each may possess different attributes which recommend them
for selection.

. .

. [F]inal determinations as to which candidate is

'best qualified' are at best subjective." 262

This case provides an example of precisely this point.
"Any differences in qualifications between Johnson and
Joyce," Brennan observed, "were minimal, to say the
least."2 63
The plan challenged in Johnson set modest short-term
goals in recognition of the limited number of minorities and
women who possessed the qualifications for certain of the
job classifications. 2 6 Thus, for skilled craft workers, the goal
was a mere three women among the 55 expected openings,
or 6%. It was stipulated that hiring was conditioned upon
"the qualifications of female applicants for particular
jobs."2 65
In short, a central tenet of the case against affirmative
action-that its beneficiaries get a windfall they do not
deserve-is simply not borne out.
Joseph Campbell famously observed that mythology
serves as the cultural framework for a society to cope with
262. Id. at 641 n.17.

263. Id. Professor Selmi is not alone in characterizing it as "remarkable" that
the two-point test score differential could be thought to tell us anything

meaningful about the qualifications of these candidates. See Michael Selmi,
Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42

U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1995). Indeed, both were rated as "well-qualified"
by the agency. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 625. The director testified that he viewed
the applicants as "essentially equal in qualification." Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728148, at *2. Nonetheless, this is the stuff of the
"reverse discrimination" narrative.
264. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 635. The Agency's Plan emphasized that the longterm goals were not to be taken as quotas for individual hiring decisions, but as
benchmarks. Indeed, if a plan failed to take qualifications into account, Brennan

observed, it "would dictate mere blind hiring by the numbers," and thus "its
validity could fairly be called into question." See id. at 635-36.
265. Id. at 637.
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its various challenges.2 66 The myths surrounding affirmative
action and preference have permitted its opponents to wrap
themselves in the high-moral ground rhetoric of a colorblind meritocracy.
CONCLUSION

'A law school is not bound by any legalprincipleto admit students
by mechanical criteria which are insensitive to the potential of
such an applicant which may be realized in a more hospitable
environment."267

In the face of all the heated controversy, we may have
lost sight of affirmative action's original purpose-to simply
provide opportunity for persons from underrepresented
groups who would not otherwise be included in, but have
good prospects to make a meaningful contribution to, the
endeavor. As Professor Stephen Carter notes and our own
experiences teach, drive and motivation may well trump
paper qualifications. 2 68 Teachers witness this in their
classes, employers in their workplaces. And, in truth, paper
qualifications are just that-a flat assessment of a complex
human being by way of questionable (and sometimes
biased) measurements.
UT did just what it was supposed to do-it sought to
measure the whole applicant, to weigh in the mix the
prospect of a candidate contributing to the racial and ethnic
diversity of a vibrant student body and ultimately to their
chosen profession. As Thurgood Marshall observed, public
actors (like UT) should not be dragged into court for such
admirable efforts, but rather commended for having taken
to heart the Court's long-standing admonitions to finally
eliminate the effects of past racial discrimination "root and
branch."2 69

266. JOSEPH A. CAMPBELL & BILL MOYERS, THE POWER OF MYTH 14 (1988).
267. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 340 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
268. See CARTER, supra note 139, at 85.
269. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 305 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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Judged by an appropriate legal standard drawn from
Bakke and Grutter, and not by the same "searching and
exacting" scrutiny applied to the miscreants of old who were
segregating black school children and criminalizing interracial marriage, affirmative action programs adopted in
good faith for the purposes those decisions found so
compelling should be left to work their laudable goal of a
more just and inclusive society.

